Employer liable for injury caused by off-duty worker

An employer could be held liable for injuries sustained by a passenger in a company truck driven by an off-duty employee, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has decided.

The defendant employer argued that because he had limited the employee's authority to use the truck, which the employee crashed while exceeding those limitations, he could not be held responsible for the accident.

But the Supreme Court disagreed, affirming a judgment in Superior Court.

"[The defendant's] limiting instructions about [the employee's] use of the vehicle, after consent, do not free him of liability under [G.L.] Sect. 31-33-6," wrote Justice Francis X. Flaherty for the court. "To hold otherwise would not only contradict settled Rhode Island law, but also would defy the legislative intent that is expressed in the controlling statutes."

The 10-page decision is Black v. Vaiciulis, et al., Lawyers Weekly No. 60-098-07. The full text of the ruling can be found on our website, www.rilawyersweekly.com.

Consistent ruling
Robert A. D'Amico II of Providence, who represented the plaintiff, said he was pleased "the court concluded that, consistent with its prior precedent ... the permissive use restrictions did not allow [the defendant] to avoid liability."

He recommended that members of the plaintiffs' bar pay close attention to the decision because he was not sure many were "aware that it is extremely difficult, under the public policy of compulsory insurance, for an insurance carrier to escape liability" in cases where restrictions are placed on the use of a vehicle.

In jury cases, D'Amico added, attorneys will want to make sure that "the jury instructions are accurate, in respect to defining what is consent."

Martin K. DeMagistris of Warwick, who represented the defendant, said that, although the court did not explicitly say as much, the decision means that Rhode Island joins only three other states in having a so-called "initial permission rule" regarding individual defendants.

"The court did rely on older case law from the 1940s and '50s to support that notion," said DeMagistris. "We didn't believe that the caselaw was dispositive of the issue. We felt that the jury was deciding a question of fact."

License to drive
M&D, a Texas-based construction company, was hired to do work at a shopping center in Cranston in September 2002.

Defendant Larry Stagner, the owner of the company, hired a laborer named Timothy Vaiciulis to help out on the project. The two drove to Rhode Island that September in Stagner's new 2002 Chevrolet Silverado pickup truck and rented trailer space at a campground in Glocester for the duration of the job.

On Sept. 27, 2002, Stagner had to make a weekend trip back to Texas for personal reasons. He drove to the airport with Vaiciulis and allegedly instructed the employee not to drive the truck other than to return directly to the campground and to pick him up at the airport two days later.

But that Saturday night, while Stagner was in Texas, Vaiciulis took the truck to a tavern near the campground, where he shared several drinks with fellow patron David Black. The two decided to return to the campground in the truck. On the way there, Vaiciulis drove the truck into a utility pole.

Vaiciulis was arrested and convicted of drunk driving.

Black, who was injured in the crash, subsequently sued the defendant in Superior Court, bringing claims under R.I.G.L. Sects. 31-33-6 and 31-33-7, which impose vicarious liability on automobile owners for injuries caused by individuals to whom they have given consent to drive their vehicles.

The jury returned a verdict for the defendant, finding that he had not provided express or implied consent for Vaiciulis to use the truck. But Judge Gilbert V. Indeglia granted the plaintiff's motion for a judgment as a matter of law and ordered a new trial.

The defendant appealed.

Sufficient consent
The Supreme Court affirmed Indeglia's new-trial order.

First, the court looked to its 1929 decision in Kernan v. Webb, in which the defendant allowed a friend to drive his automobile. In that case, although the defendant claimed he had only allowed his friend to use the car in Massachusetts, within 50 miles of Boston, the court held that the friend was the defendant's agent under Sect. 31-33-7 regardless of any limits placed on the defendant's consent and was liable.

The court also noted its 1946 decision in Baker v. Rhode Island, where it found an employer liable for injuries caused by an employee driving a company vehicle after working hours and outside the normal business route. "Our holding was ... based on the recognized intent behind the statute" not to restore certain common-law defenses that the statute was designed to eliminate, said Flaherty.

Finally, the court cited its 1949 ruling in Kent v. Draper Soap Co. In that case, said Flaherty, "we stated that the defendant would 'derive no advantage' from the contention that the driver was using the truck for his own purpose if express or implied consent was found."

Here, Flaherty continued, "there is no question that [the defendant] gave [the employee] the keys to the truck and instructed him to drive it on September 27 from the airport to the campground, and back to the airport on September 29."

Because there was no dispute that the defendant consented to the employee driving his vehicle, with limitations or otherwise, the court concluded that the defendant could be found liable for the plaintiff's injuries.

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CASE: Black v. Vaiciulis, et al., Lawyers Weekly No. 60-098-07

COURT: Rhode Island Supreme Court

ISSUE: Could an employer be held liable for injuries sustained by a passenger in a company truck driven by an off-duty employee?

DECISION: Yes, even though the employee allegedly exceeded the scope of the employer’s limitations on his use of the vehicle.